The problem to solve

There are two readings
For-Infinitival Relative clauses (FIRs) like those in (1) seem to have in principle two distinct readings, which can be paraphrased by finite relatives employing should and could.
(1)
Mrs. Schaden has come up with many problems for us to work on a. …so we'd better keep at it until they're all solved.
(=many problems that we should work on) b. ...if we want to work on a problem.
(=many problems that we could work on)
To bring out the should-interpretation in the FIR, imagine that Mrs. Schaden is a heartless slave driver who wants us to have a perfect paper before we present it. We have to work on all of the many problems that she came up with to achieve the salient goal (i.e. satisfy the desire that we present only a perfect paper). In a scenario that favors the could-interpretation, on the other hand, she is a helpful advisor who wanted only to save us from being bored over the summer. She came up with many problems that seem worthwhile to work on. We could work on one of them or all of them, or even find something entirely different to do.
A correlation between modal force and determiner strength
The main fact to be discussed in this paper concerns the distribution of these two interpretations.
On closer examination, the availability of the two readings turns out to interact in a quite surprising way with the semantic properties of the determiner of the DP whose complement NP the infinitival relative modifies. Specifically, we will show that the generalization stated in (2) (which we will refer to as the "Determiner-Modal Generalization") holds.
(2) DETERMINER MODAL GENERALIZATION (DMG):
Strong determiners (and strong interpretations of weak determiners) always induce a should-reading in for-infinitival relative clauses. Weak interpretations of weak determiners allow both should-and could-readings.
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To illustrate, notice that the examples in (3a), with strong determiners, have only the should reading; in all of these examples John has to play against the men if he wants to achieve some goal that is salient in the discourse (e.g. prove himself as a good player). On the other hand FIRs with weak determiners like those in (3b) allow both a could-and should-interpretation. One can create particularly striking instances of the DMG if a given context or world knowledge is compatible only with one reading and induces oddness under the other. Since the differences between the two readings can be rather subtle -in particular, could-readings are often subject to a kind of pragmatic strengthening that makes them seem similar to should-readings -we will use such a setup throughout the paper. Consider the sentences in (4) as an instructive example of this "pragmatically-induced disambiguation" technique.
(4) a. Norman's mother saw many/few/some/two women for him to marry at the party 'N.'s mother saw many (etc.) women that he could marry (while at the party)'
b. # Norman's mother saw every/most/two of the women for him to marry at the party 'N.'s mother saw every (etc.) woman that he should marry (while at the party).'
The pragmatics of these examples are such that the should-reading induced by the strong determiners (4b) is sensible only in a polygamous society. Weak determiners as in (4a) do not give rise to this effect, because they permit a could-interpretation, which is pragmatically available: there is nothing odd about a desire for someone to consider marrying one among a list of candidates. 
Further illustration of the DMG
To further illustrate the correctness of the DMG we show below that environments that govern the distribution of strong and weak determiners also govern the availability of could-and shouldreadings of FIRs. Specifically, environments that are known to allow only strong readings of weak determiners also allow only should-readings, while environments that allow only weak interpretations of weak determiners allow both readings.
Strong readings of weak determiners allow only should-readings of FIRs:
Individual vs. Stage-level predicates: Indefinite subjects of individual-level predicates are known to receive only strong interpretations (Diesing 1992 , Kratzer 1995 . Accordingly, FIRs modifying such subjects are limited to should-readings.
(5) a. #Many women (for Norman) to marry know French / are tall.
"Many women that Norman *could /#should marry know French / are tall" b. Many women (for Norman) to marry to are currently learning French / are sick "Many women that Norman could /#should marry are currently learning French/ are sick"
Positive-polarity some: Positive polarity items like some necessarily take scope over clausemate negation. On the assumption that this brings an indefinite out of the scope of existential closure (Diesing 1992) , enforcing a strong interpretation, the DMG predicts that only a should-reading will be possible for a FIR. A simple, non-polarity indefinite however has both options.
(6) a. A person (for me) to marry isn't available "A person that I could / should marry isn't available" b. Someone (for me) to marry isn't available "Someone that I *could / should marry isn't available"
Reconstruction into infinitivals vs. small clauses: Williams (1983) observed that an infinitival complement of "seem" allows reconstruction, whereas a small clause complement doesn't.
Correspondingly, the could interpretation disappears in the latter case (7b) -yielding the bizarre interpretation that we ought to stay at three hotels each of which is pretty full.
(7) a. Three hotels (for us) to stay at seem to be pretty full "Three hotels that we could / should stay at seem to be pretty full"
b. #Three hotels (for us) to stay at seem pretty full "Three hotels that we *could / should stay at seem pretty full"
Weak readings of weak determiners allow both could-and should-interpretations
There-construction: Weak interpretations of weak determiners are forced in the "thereconstruction" (Milsark 1974 We conclude from these facts that the correlation stated in the DMG is not merely due to the availability of weak vs. strong readings of weak determiners, but points to some ambiguity inherent in weak determiners under the weak reading. An explanation for the ambiguity of FIRs and for the DMG will have to find the property that makes quantificational determiners compatible only with should-readings while non-quantificational indefinites are compatible with both could-and should-readings.
What makes the DMG unexpected and interesting is the fact that the dependency between determiner strength and quantificational force of the modal only shows up in infinitival clauses.
Even though finite relatives with overt modals have readings that seem to be exact paraphrases of for-infinitival relatives, they do not display any such dependency. In particular, strong determiners are perfectly fine with an existential modal inside a finite relative clause:
(11) Every/most/several of the topics that you could write about are on page four
In other words, there is nothing inherent to determiner strength or to modal force that should result in a dependency such as the DMG. Apparently, some property due to the infinitival nature of FIRs plays the crucial role.
Another correlation: obligatory reconstruction under the could reading
We will conclude this section by illustrating another fact that will have to inform the account of 
Reconstruction and internally-vs. externally-headed relatives
We follow a long tradition of work on relative clauses in taking reconstruction effects to indicate the availability of an internally headed structure 4 (Carlson 1977 , Sauerland 1998 cf. also Kayne 1995 , Vergnaud 1975 . On the other hand, we assume (with Carlson) that an alternative structure is also available, in which the relative modifies an external NP. It is the availability of this alternative structure -in which there is no raising of the NP 5 -that accounts for the nonobligatoriness that in general characterizes reconstruction in relative clauses.
We are then led to the conclusion that FIRs under the could-interpretation have only the headinternal structure available. The obligatory reconstruction effects seen above follow from the unavailability of the alternative structure. From this perspective, the puzzle to be explained is why FIRs under the could-reading have only the internally headed structure. consider more than one potential bride) of a FIR that modifies a DP in the coda position of the existential there construction.
Summary
We have seen that for-infinitival relatives are ambiguous between two readings, and that this ambiguity correlates systematically with different structural environments as well as different internal structures for the relative clause. Specifically the following two asymmetries have to be explained: First, a FIR modifies an NP complement of a quantificational determiner, the shouldreading is forced, while non-quantificational DPs allow both should-and could-readings.
Second, if the relative clause has an externally headed structure (as is forced in antireconstruction environments), the should-reading is again forced. Internally headed relatives allow both should-and could-readings.
The Proposal
To account for the DMG we have to make explicit assumptions about the encoding of "determiner strength" (assumption A), as well as the semantic properties of FIRs (assumption B).
For expository reasons, we will state these assumptions in terms of the semantic types of determiners and of FIRs. In the next three subsections we state each of these assumptions in turn and then show how the DMG follows. In section 2.4 we provide evidence that the assumptions are warranted independently of the DMG.
Assumption A: The difference between weak and strong determiners
The specific assumption that we adopt is that quantificational determiners (i.e. strong determiners and strong interpretations of weak determiners) compose with their restrictor, the NP, to yield a generalized quantifier of type <et,t>. We also assume, following e.g. Chierchia (1995) that the NP is a one-place (extensional) predicate of type <e,t> at least at the point at which it composes with a determiner. 7 Hence the semantic type of strong determiner will be <et,<et,t>>, and the structure of a quantificational DP is as indicated in (17). For non-quantificational (weak interpretations of weak) determiners we assume, on the other hand, that they are cardinality predicates (cf. Milsark 1974 Milsark , 1977 . Further, we will argue that they can come either in an extensional or in an intensional version. Specifically, they can be optionally of type <e,t> or <e,st>. Given that they are modifiers, rather than quantifiers that compose with their NP arguments via functional application, weak determiners compose via predicate modification with their sister node (18). Consequently, for a non-quantificational determiner to be interpretable, its sister node has to be of the same type as the determiner.
(18) Non-quantificational Determiners At this point in the discussion, for expository purposes, we simply stipulate this difference between the two types of FIRs. In section 3 we will show how it can be derived from claims about their internal structure. In addition, we provide evidence below that our assumptions (both about the semantic types of FIRs under the two readings and about the distinctions between determiner types) are warranted. But first we will demonstrate that the assumptions are sufficient to derive the DMG.
Deriving the DMG Finite relatives and should-relatives:
The syntax of DPs with should-FIRs is exactly the same as for DPs with ordinary finite relative clauses: the NP and its relative clause sister are both of type <e,t> and compose by predicate modification. The resulting node composes with the determiner, either as its complement (by functional application, in the case of quantificational determiners (21a)) or by predicate modification (with non-quantificational determiners of the extensional variety (21b)). 
It is clear that the DMG follows from these assumptions. The could-reading of a FIR is possible only if the FIR is sister to an (intensional) weak determiner, while the should-reading is allowed both with quantificational determiners and with (extensional) weak determiners. The next subsection provides independent support for each of the assumptions. 
Further consequences
Taken together, the last two observations -the uninterpretability of the head NP in its surface position under the could-reading (a consequence of assumption A), and the type ambiguity of non-quantificational determiners (assumption B) -yield a fairly intricate range of predictions.
First, they predict the asymmetric reconstruction pattern shown in section 1.3. If, for some reason, reconstruction of the head NP is impossible, only the should-interpretation will be detectable with weak determiners. Anti-reconstruction environments (like 12a, 13a) require an externally-headed structure for the relative, hence the relative has to be of type <e,t> and only a should-FIR will be possible.
Second, the claim that could-relatives cannot compose with external NPs predicts an otherwise completely unexpected pattern of Condition A reconstruction effects. Given that the head NP of a could-FIR cannot be interpreted in its surface position, the strict locality requirement on reflexive binding (Condition A) should be disrupted if the antecedent for a reflexive pronoun is external to a could-relative. (26) shows that, as predicted, an external antecedent disambiguates a FIR to the should-reading -it lacks the meaning that is paraphraseable as (27). The couldreading reappears if the reflexive is changed to a normal pronoun (28). (26) There seem to Clinton to be many stories about himself for you to write up, #…if you feel the need to write an article could-reading …if you're interested in keeping your job should-reading (27) There seem to Clinton to be many stories about himself that you could write up.
There seem to Clinton to be many stories about him for you to write up, …if you feel the need to write an article could-reading …if you're interested in keeping your job
should-reading
A third prediction is that the free variable provided by non-quantificational DPs has to be bound externally; if the external syntax does not provide a suitable binder, the DP has to be quantificational. We have already seen evidence for this in section 1.2. Indefinite subjects of individual-level predicates, positive-polarity some and subjects of small-clause complements of seem all escape existential closure, hence must be quantificational, which in turn forces FIRs modifying them to be of the should-variety.
The flip side of this coin consists of contexts in which a ban on vacuous quantification imposes a non-quantificational reading on an indefinite (e.g. when-conditionals). The familiar contrast in (29) shows that if the only candidate for providing a variable is an indefinite subject (e.g. of an individual-level predicate), then a non-quantificational reading is forced.
(29) a. When a farmer is tall, he plays basketball. 
Summary
We have shown in this section that the DMG follows from our assumptions about the compositional properties of quantificational (strong) and non-quantificational (weak) determiners on the one hand and the two kinds of FIRs on the other. These assumptions also explained the observed reconstruction asymmetry in FIRs. Furthermore, we argued that an intricate set of otherwise unexpected BT(A) reconstruction facts as well as variable binding effects with FIRs in when-clauses followed.
The Meaning of For-infinitival Relative Clauses
So far we have limited our description of the modality in FIRs to using the informal labels should and could, implying that the main difference lies in the quantificational force of a covert modal operator. Our account of the DMG relies on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the semantic type of the FIR and its interpretation. Specifically, we assumed that FIRs that give rise to the should-reading are always of type <e,t> while those that
give rise to the could-reading are always of type <e,st>. The purpose of this section will be to justify that claim.
We follow a longstanding tradition in philosophy and linguistics that analyzes modality in terms of restricted quantification over possible worlds. Portner (1997) -is that they are inherently 'future-oriented.' The intuition to capture then is that a modal restrictor that is based on desires/goals contains only 'future possibilities' or 'possible developments' of the world of evaluation.
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In the first sub-section we will make an explicit proposal that spells out what it means for a modal operator to quantify over possible developments of the world of evaluation. We will then
show how these properties -needed independently to capture the truth conditions of bouletic statements -can be used to derive the correlation between the modal force of FIRs and their semantic type. Our specific proposal will be that all FIRs are inherently existential, and that the should meaning results from an additional (universal) operator that is 'stacked' above the existential; the truth conditions will be shown to follow from this derived structure together with the properties of the bouletic modal restrictor. We conclude the section with two independent arguments that support the 'modal stacking' hypothesis.
Bouletic modality: quantification over a world's 'possible developments'
In general, the restrictor of a modal operator (the modal base) is given by an accessibility relation R that maps the world of evaluation to a set of accessible worlds. For instance, in a sentence like Hydrangeas can grow here (Kratzer 1991) the modal quantifies over a set of worlds all of which have in common that the relevant facts about here (soil quality, climate, etc.)
hold in them as well. In other words, the set of accessible worlds given by the modal restrictor is an equivalence class defined over these facts. To a first approximation, the sentence claims that there is at least one of these circumstantially equivalent worlds in which hydrangeas do indeed grow here (or the counterpart of here in that world). This is a rather weak claim as its truth doesn't depend on whether hydrangeas grow in the world of evaluation, or whether they ever did or ever will grow here.
A bouletic statement like You could plant hydrangeas here (if you want to have a pretty garden)
crucially differs in that for it to be true it has to be a future possibility that you actually do grow hydrangeas and end up with a pretty garden. 14 This requirement imposed by the bouletic modal base is what makes bouletic modality more narrowly restricted than bare circumstantial modality (the case illustrated in Kratzer's example above). Specifically, the modal quantifies not over worlds that are just circumstantially equivalent, but rather those that share relevant features with the evaluation world at the time of evaluation -and in which a contextually salient goal is achieved at some time in the future.
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Building time into bouletic modality: branching timelines and world-time pairs
The claim about a bouletic base is that it contains worlds that are indistinguishable from the world of evaluation up to the time of evaluation and differ only wrt. the future. To make things more easily accessible, we think there is some justification for abstracting away from time in the description of the meaning given by bouletic modality. Hence, we will use only properties of the accessibility relation to yield the effects of quantification over world-time pairs. Even though this is a simplification, we believe that it is a reasonable move for present purposes. 16 An accessibility relation that ensures this will be anti-symmetric and transitive. The partially ordered set of worlds given by such a relation can be depicted as a branching tree structure representing a time line that branches into the future. In other words, the worlds that a bouletic modal quantifies over is the set of all possible developments of the world of evaluation which is then further narrowed down by intersecting it with the set of worlds that satisfy the salient goal/desire.
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Given these assumptions, we are equipped to give a (semi-explicit) description of the LFs that we want to assign to bouletic modal sentences as in (32), which are the finite counterparts of our could-and should-relatives. In the examples below, we use the notation R b to indicate the bouletic accessibility relation. We think that, in order to give an accurate description of the truth conditions of bouletic sentences such as in (32a,b) something like our LFs is necessary. Whether our particular formulation, specifically the notion "possible development of a world," is indeed correct cannot be determined without independent considerations. In fact, once we complete our account of the Determiner-Modal Generalization we think that we will have provided independent support for that notion since something like it is a crucial component of our story. 
The Central Idea: Could-meanings are basic
The central insight of our proposal is that the should-interpretation can be derived from the structure that gives rise to the could-interpretation by means that are needed independently. As for the could-interpretation, we assume that it is basic, due to the very fact that the relatives in question are for-to-infinitivals. In other words, we claim that the could interpretation is intrinsic to FIRs -however, detectable only if there is no motivation to produce a derived structure that yields the should-interpretation.
A natural hypothesis about the source of the existential meaning intrinsic to FIRs is that it comes from the infinitival marker TO. Infinitival TO is syntactically in the right position to compose with a sentential node (the VP). We propose the lexical entry in (33), according to which TO denotes a modal operator that has existential force and that takes a bouletic modal base as restrictor, i.e. a set of possible developments of w, ordered with respect to some desire held in the world of evaluation. Furthermore, we assume that existential TO applied to its complement yields a set of possible worlds -it results in a constituent of type <s,t>, with an open world position that must be bound from above. p(w') = q(w') = 1.
Our assumption that the existential modal (whether or not it is TO) has an extra world argument position in its lexical entry is crucial. A consequence is that after the relative clause operator 21 moves -which has the semantic effect of producing a derived predicate (expressed in terms of lambda abstraction over individuals) -we end up with a structure that has the semantic type (the set of individuals x s.t. there is at least one world w" that is a possible development of w' that is consistent with some goal held in w', and in which PRO writes about topic
We do not have independent evidence for the crucial assumption that TO passes up an open world position. However there is a clear intuition behind that assumption. Infinitival clauses are dependent: typically they cannot stand just by themselves and yield a grammatical output. One natural way to encode this requirement of an embedding matrix is to assume that a variablethe world or situation pronouns by which the tense, mode or mood of a clause is encoded 23 -has to be bound or quantified over and the binder/quantifier has to be introduced by the higher structure that embeds the infinitival. Presumably, it is a property of the INFL node of infinitival clauses to introduce the lambda abstraction over worlds, which is exactly what our assumption stipulates, since the abstraction is built into the lexical entry for the infinitival marker.
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The next question to ask is how we get a should-reading given that all for-infinitivals are inherently could-infinitivals. Following our type assignment, the infinitival has to be of type <e,t> to yield a should-interpretation. Therefore we need to find a way to turn an <e,st> infinitival relative into one that is of type <e,t>. Building on the assumptions made for couldinfinitivals, we can achieve this goal by means of "binding off" (i.e. quantifying over) the open world variable that was introduced by the existential TO operator -before raising of the relative operator. What we need is a modal operator that takes the infinitival as its nuclear scope. The result of applying this modal operator to the infinitival clause is a node of type t, which is then turned into a derived (extensional) predicate after the relative operator moves, as in (35).
We assume that the quantificational force of this covert modal operator is universal, and that inserting it is a freely available option. Various researchers have concluded on the basis of converging lines of evidence that there is such a silent universal modal operator: probably the best known and most widely accepted example is Kratzer's account of conditional if-clauses as restricting a silent universal modal. Except for the fact that it is silent, it behaves exactly like any other modal operator. In particular, its modal base is determined by the conversational background via anaphor resolution. 25 The result for our cases is that it has the same modal base as the existential modal TO. Taking these observations together, we end up with structures like (35) for should-infinitivals. We propose that (35) (the set of individuals x s.t. for every w' that is a possible development of w consistent with the salient goal held in w, there is at least one w", a possible development of w' that is consistent with the salient goal held in w' and in which PRO writes about topic x)
In other words, we claim that should-infinitivals are more complicated than the label or the paraphrase would suggest. They actually contain two modal operators, an existential which comes directly from the infinitive (specifically from TO), and on top of that a universal modal that effectively inherits the modal base from TO. Since we assume that the modal restrictor is bouletic for both modal operators (both being anaphoric on the context), this stacking of the modals predicts, as we argue below, the right truth conditions for should-FIRs.
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To see that this is the case it is helpful to work with the branching tree structure representation of the worlds that are quantified over in bouletic statements. A simple universal modal with a bouletic restrictor will yield a sentence that is true iff every world that branches off from the world of evaluation and is consistent with the salient goal also verifies the nuclear scope (e.g.
PRO writes about topic x)
. If the nuclear scope of the universal is an existential modal statement that is also bouletic and whose evaluation world is bound by the universal, then an additional layer of branching worlds is introduced. That means that the whole sentence will be true iff for every world that branches off from the evaluation world (and is consistent with the salient goal -a 'p-world' for short), there is at least one further world branching off from it in which the nuclear scope of the embedded existential is true (a 'q-world'). 
Notice that the truth conditions predicted by a statement with stacked modal operators are weaker than those predicted if a universal operator alone is used. In particular, the situation depicted in (36) contains a world (w 2 ) that is a p-world and not a q-world. The existence of such a world immediately falsifies a simple universal statement; however the stacked structure would come out to be true -because w 2 gives off a branch that is both a p-and a q-world.
On the other hand, the truth conditions predicted by stacking are crucially stronger than those that would result from a simple existential operator. To see this, consider (37). The situation depicted there also contains a world (w 6 ) that is a p-world without being a q-world, but (unlike w 2 in (36)) does not itself branch into a p-and q-world. This is sufficient to falsify our stacking structure. However, a simple existential statement would clearly come out true, because there are worlds that are both p-and q-worlds (namely w 4 and w 5 ). Thus far, we have shown that modal stacking as proposed above (universal over existential), together with the specific properties of the bouletic base, yields a statement that is neither universal nor existential. We think that one can make sense of this peculiar result by a consideration of the notion 'being consistent with a goal,' which comes with the bouletic base. It seems that a world can be 'consistent with' a goal held in the evaluation world even if the goal is not yet achieved -as long as there is some future world branching from it in which the goal is satisfied. Notice that this 'postponement' of goal-satisfaction is allowed only with the multiple layers of branching given by stacked modals. What is enforced by such a statement -and what crucially makes it stronger than an existential statement -is that a world in a given layer of branching may be a p-world without necessarily being a q-world, but only if it leads to a world that is a p-and q-world. What the should-reading says, then, is that every world that is consistent with the goals held in the evaluation world is either a q-world or a non-q-world that is on a path leading to at least one world that is both a p-and q-world.
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3.3 A further argument for modal stacking: Negation and existential TO Inserting the universal modal to "bind off" the free variable is a freely available strategy; i.e. the modal operator is never selected but can always be chosen. The principles of semantic composition will filter out under which conditions inserting that modal will yield an interpretable structure. As we have shown, these two structures and the underlying derivations that give rise to them allows for a principled explanation for the DMG. 29 If it can be shown that TO denotes an existential modal operator, then we will have independent evidence for the existence of stacked operators under the should-reading. Since TO is present in all FIRs, something else has to be responsible for the universal force in should-FIRs. We give an argument here that this is indeed the case.
On the assumption that TO is an existential operator, we expect it to interact with scope bearing elements just like any other modal operator does. Specifically, for clausemate negation that takes scope over to (to express "not>could p" 30 ) we expect that it will result in a structure equivalent in meaning to "should>not p", following simple predicate logic equivalences. That means that inserting a silent modal operator to bind off the free variable will not result in a detectable change in meaning even though the type changes from <e,st> to <e,t>. This is so because stacking a universal on top of a "universal", i.e. a structure that is already equivalent in meaning to a universal, will not change the modal force. In other words, we predict that only a shouldreading will be detectable in for-infinitivals with clausemate negation taking scope over TO. On the other hand, forcing negation to take scope under TO, we get could>not p. In this case, both
should-and a could-interpretation are predicted to be available depending on whether the default universal is inserted or not. This is so because the basic reading is existential and stacking a universal modal on top of TO as proposed for the regular cases would also change the modal force to a universal in this case. In other words, assuming that TO is an existential modal operator together with the proposal for the derivation of the should-reading makes the surprising prediction that negation depending on its relative scope with respect to TO will disambiguate the for-infinitival in one case but not in the other. This prediction is borne out as can be seen in the contrast in (38 In (38a) where negation takes scope over TO only, one reading, the should>not reading, is detectable. In (38b) where we force negation to take scope under the infinitival using conjunction we get the familiar ambiguity, i.e. both the could>not and should>not reading is available.
Finally, (38c) shows that the Determiner Modal Generalization still holds, i.e. a strong determiner like every still disambiguates in favor of the should (not) reading because it forces the infinitival to be of type <e,t> which means that the structure is interpretable only if the world variable is closed off by the default universal.
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This pattern of interaction between syntactic position of negation and interpretation of the FIR is unexpected unless two modal operators are present in should-readings, the existential being in the scope of the universal. In particular, it would be inadequate to assume that there is one modal operator that is strengthened in various contexts. Such a modal would be obviously inadequate if it were in any other position than the one TO occupies, since the different positions of negation wouldn't have any effect. However, even if it were in the position of TO, or if it were TO itself that in a chameleon like fashion would acquire universal or existential force depending on the context, it would be left unexplained why the not>should (equivalently the could>not) reading is impossible.
Summary
We have presented a set of new facts about the syntax and the semantics of for-infinitival relative clauses which established a rather striking generalization: that FIRs can in principle have two readings which are distinguished in their modal force (could vs. should), and that the modal interpretation correlates with the strength of the determiner (the Determiner Modal Generalization). We argue that the DMG follows from the compositional properties of the players involved (i.e. strong and weak determiners, NPs and FIRs). Limiting ourselves to the basic semantic composition rules (Functional Application and Predicate Modification) and fairly well-motivated assumptions about the nature of quantificational and non-quantificational determiners, we used the DMG to probe into the internal structure of these infinitival clauses.
Among the chief results of our investigation is that one of the readings (the could-interpretation)
is inherent to the infinitival -due to the fact that TO is an existential modal operator -while the other reading (the should-interpretation) is derived. The explanation we gave for the DMG also accounted for a surprising pattern of reconstruction effects, in particular, that in couldinfinitivals the head NP has to be interpreted internal to the relative clause, entailing a 'head raising' derivation for these cases.
Notes:
1 Very often, should carries a "deontic flavor", however it is not limited to this type of interpretation. The full range of meanings available to should is available as well to infinitival relatives. Their most important characteristic is that they can be paraphrased in terms of achieving a goal that is salient in the discourse, as in If you want to have good coffee, you should try mine /here's a cup for you to try. Here, the salient goal of "having good coffee" is supplied by the if-clause, and the should modal is understood, informally, as "the way to achieve that goal...."
(The could modal on the other hand is understood more as "one way to achieve the goal....") 2 We won't have anything profoundly new to say about "weak" and "strong" determiners, but will simply follow Milsark (1974 Milsark ( , 1977 and much subsequent work in distinguishing between them -i.e. we use the familiar classification given by the "there-construction test" among others to categorize determiners. As is well-known this characterization of the notion "determiner strength" makes it necessary to distinguish between strong and weak interpretations of weak determiners. A characteristic property of these examples seems to be that they are interpreted teleologically;
that is, the head NPs are understood as in some sense "designed" for the purpose expressed by the FIR. For a suggestion that this class of apparent exceptions has a principled explanation, see note 28. 4 If the head NP raises to its surface position then reconstruction effects follow from the copy theory of movement.
5 And hence no copy in the position of the gap (cf. previous footnote). See Sauerland 1998 for an alternative account that assumes the optionality does not lie in the availability of different structures.
6 Capital letters indicate phonological prominence.
7 Note that we do not exclude the possibility that there could be a world variable inside the NP which could then be available for binding from outside. What is crucial for our account is that at the level at which the NP composes with a strong determiner it is an extensional predicate.
an abstract that binds y. This assumption is also made in Fox (forthcoming) and spelled out (for which-phrases) in Rullman and Beck (1998). 12 We have already seen (section 1.3) that we cannot exclude a head internal structure for shouldinfinitivals. 13 Many researchers have noticed that for-infinitivals have a future orientation (Bresnan 1972 , Stowell 1982 , Pesetsky 1992 ). Our claim is that this future-orientation is a property of bouletic modality in general; for-infinitivals have the range of meanings that they do because they are limited to bouletic modality.
14 Bouletic statements seem to also have felicity conditions which include that having a pretty garden is in principle not impossible as well as that growing hydrangeas and having a pretty garden is not realized in the world of evaluation yet. 15 One of the most important insights of Kratzer's work on modality -which we assume in our exposition as the basic framework -is the recognition that the context determines the nature of the modality involved in an utterance. A formal way of encoding this dependency is to assume that the restrictor of a modal operator is ultimately determined by the context. This can be achieved by supposing that the set of accessible worlds given by a particular accessibility relation is intersected with whatever is salient in the discourse e.g. the desires held by the speaker. over the modal base based on how close the worlds come to realize the desire.
18 It should be clear from the above discussion that R b is not a primitive notion of the theory, but merely a shorthand for a particular choice of accessibility relation together with a contextually supplied set of worlds (i.e. a salient "desire," "goal," etc.).
19 Portner (1992 Portner ( , 1997 ) invokes a similar intuition using the metaphor of the reference situation s growing into a larger situation s' that is a p-situation, where the implicit assumption is that situations can grow only into the future. 20 For concreteness, we encode the observation that FIRs tolerate only a specific kind of modal base in terms of a definedness condition ("p ⊆ R b ") on the first argument of TO, where R b is assumed to stand for the modal base rather than the accessibility relation per se. Another possibility would be to say that it is the FOR complementizer that is the source of the bouletic modal base. 21 Or the NP in the case of a head-raising structure.
22 For explicitness, we represent the world variables syntactically as pronouns in the tree (34a).
We have no particular stake in whether these pronouns are actually in LF representations. What is crucial is that such variables (e.g. the sister of R b , w') are able to be bound by operators that are present in the syntax at whatever level of representation operator-variable relationships are interpreted. 23 In a situation semantic rendition of the framework (cf. Berman 1987 , Kratzer 1989 Cf. the discussion in section 3.1 on the context dependency of the modal base. 26 This state of affairs is somewhat surprising given that stacking a universal on top of an existential operator generally results in weak truth conditions (i.e. existential force). 27 It is clear that the way 'being consistent with a goal' is used here is weaker than what is typically assumed about how modal bases are constructed, namely that p has to hold in all the worlds of the modal base. It remains to be seen whether this weaker notion can be justified on independent grounds. 28 Note also that the possibility of deriving these surprisingly strong truth conditions from a universal stacked over an existential modal operator relies on a crucial assumption: both operators must be restricted by a bouletic base (and more specifically, by the same contextually salient goal or desire). If one of the modal operators were restricted by a non-bouletic base, we would then expect to find weak truth conditions: the higher quantifier would no longer have an effect on the truth-conditions and we would be left with an existential statement. Such cases should yield apparent violations of the Determiner Modal Generalization, but would ideally be marked by some distinctive property suggesting a distinct modal restrictor. We believe that the "design" readings mentioned in note 3 constitute exactly this predicted class of apparent counterexamples:
(i) Every pen to write with is in the top desk drawer.
Recall that those examples are characterized by a teleological interpretation. This interpretation seems to us to indicate a modal base akin to the one that characterizes 'ability' or 'dispositional' attributions (cf. Hackl 1998) . A distinguishing property of these -unlike modals restricted by the bouletic base -is that their truth is independent of whether the nuclear scope is (or was) ever realized (see the discussion of Kratzer's example in section 3.1).
To illustrate, the truth conditions for (i) say about every pen x (roughly) that x must be in the desk drawer as long as it has the following property: that all worlds equivalent to the evaluation world (with respect to the essential properties of x) have at least one possible development that is both consistent with the contextually salient goal and in which PRO writes with x. These truth conditions are as weak as those of the could-reading. 29 On a side note, given the derivation for the should-reading -specifically the claim that inserting a default universal modal operator is freely available -we predict that stand-alone infinitives actually should be grammatical. Recall that we pinpointed the problem of infinitival clauses standing alone as well-formed utterances in terms of a variable that needed to be bound.
Since the universal can do that in relative clauses without recourse to the matrix, it should be able to do that in general. In other words, we predict stand-alone infinitives to be fine (at least under certain pragmatically marked conditions) -and that they should have universal modal force. In fact cases like this are attested. Portner (1997:183) for instance gives the following cases:
(i) a. Oh, to someday meet her! b.
To have suffered so long and had it come in the end to this.
For (ia) it is clear that the modal force is universal as predicted. In (i.b) there doesn't appear to be any modal dimension to the interpretation of the infinitival. Obviously, the aspectual properties of the predicate are crucial. We leave the question how these non-modal readings can be derived consistently with our theory for future research.
with the indicated scope relations, i.e. wide scope of the modal which means in particular that could>not is equivalent to don't have to which is not (necessarily) true for "couldn't" for which at least the preferred reading is with negation taking scope over the modal. 31 Negation that takes narrow scope with respect to TO seems to yield what is frequently called "(VP-) constituent negation" which is supposed to be different from sentential negation. But this won't affect the argument. Even if the narrow-scope negation is different, one still needs to explain the absence of one of the readings when sentential negation is used. On our account, it is straightforward why sentential negation lacks the could>not reading: negation takes scope over existential TO.
32 There may be a pragmatic confound, namely that the could>not reading is possibly unavailable independently on the grounds that its truth is implied by could alone. To be certain that the result claimed in the text is a real one, we need to set up a context that makes a should>not interpretation infelicitous while favoring a don't have to (which is equivalent to could>not)
reading. An infinitival that has negation taking scope over to should simply be odd under these circumstances, because the only reading that the structure supports is one that is equivalent to should>not. Narrow scope for negation, on the other hand, should be fine. This seems to be the case. Imagine for the following examples that Norman is stingy and want to go out with a woman whom he doesn't have to spend money on: 
